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Case No. 20070559-SC 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
BUSHCO, d.b.a. Babydolls Escorts, VALLEY RECREATION, INC., d.b.a. Kitty's 
Escort and Angel's Escort, THE D. HOUSE, L.L.C., d.b.a. The Doll House, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
AMERICAN BUSH, INC. and DENALI, L.L.C., d.b.a. Southern Exposure, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants in Intervention, 
v. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION and PAM HENDRICKSON, R. BRUCE 
JOHNSON, D'ARCY DIXON PIGNANELLI, and MARC B. JOHNSON, in their 
official capacities as members of the Utah State Tax Commission, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Appeal from a Final Judgment and Order of the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Tyrone Medley, Presiding 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from the Final Judgment and Order Granting Defendants1 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
entered by the Third Judicial District Court on July 3, 2007, ruling Utah's Sexually 
Explicit Business and Escort Service Tax constitutional under the First Amendment 
(R. 1206-10). Plaintiffs' timely notice of appeal was filed on July 5, 2007 (R. 1225-26). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (West 2004) gives this Court jurisdiction over this appeal 
as one not within the original appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
1. The district court correctly concluded that the Sexually Explicit Business and 
Escort Service Tax is content-neutral for the purpose of First Amendment analysis. This 
issue is preserved in defendants' memorandum supporting summary judgment 
(R. 1036-40) and in the court's decision (R. 1207, ffif 2-3). 
Standard of Review: Under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment "shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.1' In 
determining the propriety of summary judgment, the court "need review only whether the 
trial court erred by applying the governing law and whether a material fact was in 
dispute." Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, K 21, 48 P.3d 895. The trial court's 
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 
13,U16,73P.3d325. 
2. The district court, declining to apply strict scrutiny, correctly concluded that the 
Sexually Explicit Business and Escort Service Tax is constitutional under the 
intermediate scrutiny test of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). This issue 
was preserved for review in defendants' memorandum supporting summary judgment 
2 
(R. 1041-45), and the trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on this basis 
(R. 1207-08,H1|3-4). 
Standard of Review: A trial court's conclusion that a statute is constitutional 
presents a question of law reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. State v. Ross, 
2007 UT 89, H 17, P.3d , 2007 WL 3225412. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the 
issues before the Court is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
This action began on June 7, 2004, when the original plaintiffs, entertainment 
businesses featuring semi-nude dancing, filed their complaint (R. 1-26). The complaint 
alleged that the Sexually Explicit Business and Escort Service Tax, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 59-27-101 through -108, violates plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the federal constitution. Itfurther alleged that the tax effects a taking 
under unspecified rules, regulations, and statutes. The complaint sought both injunctive 
relief and damages. Before defendants answered, plaintiffs amended the complaint 
(R. 30-44), naming an escort service as an additional plaintiff, and moved for a 
preliminary injunction (R. 27-29); defendants moved to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, 
including failure to exhaust administrative remedies (R. 176-78 (motion); 179-94 
(memorandum)). The trial court denied the injunction and granted defendants' motion to 
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dismiss (R. 373 (minute entry); 382-86 (order)), and plaintiffs appealed (R. 374-75 
(notice of appeal); 379-81 (amended notice of appeal)). The Utah Court of Appeals 
reversed and remanded in a memorandum decision filed on November 18, 2004, 
concluding that the facial challenge to the statute's constitutionality under the First 
Amendment was a threshold legal issue not amenable to administrative resolution. See 
TDM, Inc. v. Tax Comm% 2004 UT App 433, 103 P.3d 190; R. 405-07. This Court 
denied defendants' petition for writ of certiorari by order of March 17, 2005 (R. 401). 
On remand, plaintiffs filed second (R. 442-54) and third (R. 547-59) amended 
complaints, which sought only declaratory and injunctive relief, and moved to file a 
fourth amended complaint (R. 572-73), which the trial court denied (R. 735-37). On 
August 14, 2006, American Bush, a formerly added and subsequently dismissed plaintiff, 
moved for intervention (R. 853-55); Denali, L.L.C. did likewise on September 12, 2006 
(R. 961-63). The trial court granted both motions by order of November 28, 2006 
(R. 1003-07). Defendants then filed an amended motion for summary judgment on 
February 15, 2007 (R. 1053-55 (motion); 1056-76 (memorandum)), which the court 
granted in a final judgment and order filed July 3, 2007 (R. 1206-10). This appeal 
followed (R. 1225-1226). 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
The Sexually Explicit Business and Escort Service Tax was enacted effective July 
1, 2004. Before its passage, the Utah Legislature held committee hearings in which the 
committee members heard testimony from the bill's sponsor as well as from Kathy Ockey, 
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an employee of the Utah Department of Corrections who had, at the time of the hearing, 
dealt with sex offenders for eighteen years; Dr. Larry Fox; and Attorney General Mark 
Shurtleff The testimony addressed the secondary effects caused by patronage of sexually 
explicit businesses and escort services, which include commission of sexual offenses and 
high rates of recidivism among sex offenders (see R. 133-34; 138; 328; 340), and the 
need to fund sex offender treatment to prevent future offenses (R. 130-31; 338). 
As enacted, the tax does not apply to sexually explicit businesses at which 
individuals' genitals, pubic region, and female breast below a point immediately above the 
top of the areola are completely and opaquely covered-the same restrictions placed on 
premises and events licensed under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 32A-1-105(30) and (49), -602 (West Supp. 2007) (formerly found at Utah Code 
Ann. § 32A-5-107(38)(a) (West 2004)). These restrictions are also similar to the G-string 
and pasties requirement in a South Salt Lake ordinance upheld under the First 
Amendment by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 
165 Fed. Appx. 627, 2006 WL 245160 (10th Cir. 2006) {Heideman II) (Addendum A, 
attached), and by this Court under the state constitution in American Bush v. City of South 
Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 1235 (Utah 2006). In fact, plaintiffs provided the trial court copies of 
letters advising current plaintiff American Bush and former plaintiff Due South that their 
compliance with, respectively, the South Salt Lake ordinance and the Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Act rendered the tax inapplicable to them (R. 601-03). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' arguments are premised on a fundamental error: that the statute here at 
issue is "directed at nudity that is 'accompanied by expressive activity'[.]" Aplt. Brief at 
15 (quoting City of Erie v. Pap's A. M, 529 U.S. 277, 290 (2000) (plurality opinion)). 
Plaintiffs offer no support for this assertion, and nothing in the statute refers to expressive 
activity; therefore, the statute is content-neutral. Moreover, to the extent that the statute 
impacts expressive conduct at all, it is targeted at the negative secondary effects of that 
conduct, not at the conduct itself-another form of content neutrality. Thus, the trial court 
correctly found the statute content-neutral for purposes of First Amendment analysis. 
And because nudity, by itself, is not a form of protected expression, it is not entitled to 
First Amendment protection. Any impingement of the statute on plaintiffs' provision of 
nude dancing or other forms of nude entertainment passes intermediate scrutiny under 
United States v. O'Brien as no greater than necessary to further an important 
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
STATUTE IS CONTENT-NEUTRAL FOR PURPOSES OF FIRST 
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS. 
For purposes of First Amendment analysis, a statute can be content-neutral in two 
ways. First, a statute is content-neutral in the classic sense if it is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression. See Heideman v. South Salt Lake City (Heideman 7), 348 
F.3d 1182, 1192 (10th Cir. 2003). As the Tenth Circuit Court stated, "a general 
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prohibition on nudity is 'unrelated to the expression of free expression' because such a law 
prohibits a class of conduct, the act of appearing nude in public, without reference to any 
element of expression." Id.; see also Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 289 (plurality opinion) 
("Being 'in a state of nudity' is not an inherently expressive condition."). In the second 
sense, a statute is content-neutral "if the government's regulatory purpose is not based on 
the communicative aspect of the speech." Heideman /, 348 F.3d at 1193. This category 
of content neutrality renders regulations on speech "'content-neutral' not because they 
apply to conduct on a generally applicable basis without regard to expressive content, but 
because the regulatory purpose is unrelated to that content." Id. The Tenth Circuit "has 
held that restrictions based on the negative secondary effects of sexually oriented 
businesses are 'content-neutral' in this sense." Id. (citing Z.J. Gifts D-2, L.L.C. v. City of 
Aurora, 136 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1998)). Utah's Sexually Explicit Business and 
Escort Service Tax (the SEBES tax) is content-neutral in both senses. 
Nothing in the statute refers to any expressive element of speech. The statute, by 
its own terms, applies to sexually explicit businesses and escort services. Under the 
statute's definitions, 
"Sexually explicit business" means a business at which any nude or partially 
denuded individual, regardless of whether the nude or partially denuded 
individual is an employee of the sexually explicit business or an 
independent contractor, performs any service: 
(a) personally on the premises of the sexually explicit business; 
(b) during at least 30 consecutive or nonconsecutive days within a 
calendar year; and 
(c) for: 
(i) a salary; 
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(ii) a fee; 
(iii) a commission; 
(iv) hire; 
(v) profit; or 
(vi) any amount similar to an amount listed in this Subsection 
(4)(c). 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-27-102(4) (West 2004). By narrowly defining "nude or partially 
denuded" as a condition that this Court has already determined, in American Bush, may 
be prohibited altogether, the tax on its face does not restrict expression as an element of 
conduct to which the tax applies. 
The statute defines an escort service as "any person who furnishes or arranges for 
an escort to accompany another individual for: (a) companionship; and (b)(i) a salary; (ii) 
a fee; (iii) a commission; (iv) hire; (v) profit; or (vi) any amount similar to an amount 
listed in this Subsection (2)(b)." Utah Code Ann. § 59-27-102(2) (West 2004). The 
language of these definitions contains no reference to any element of expression. Nor 
does the language imposing the tax refer to expressive elements of the conduct to which 
the tax applies. Under Utah Code Ann. § 59-27-103 (West 2004), 
(1) A tax is imposed on a sexually explicit business equal to 10% of 
amounts paid to or charged by the sexually explicit business for the 
following transactions: 
(a) an admission fee; 
(b) a user fee; 
(c) a retail sale of tangible personal property made within the state; 
(d) a sale of: 
(i) food and food ingredients as defined in Section 59-12-102; 
or 
(ii) prepared food as defined in Section 59-12-102; 
(e) a sale of a beverage; and 
(f) any service. 
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(2)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), a tax is imposed on an escort 
service equal to 10% of amounts paid or charged by the escort service for 
any transaction that involves providing an escort to another individual. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), the tax imposed by Subsection 
(2)(a)does not apply to a transaction that is subject to the tax imposed in 
Subsection (1). 
Because nothing in the statutory language addresses any expressive element of conduct, 
the statute is content-neutral in the classic sense. The tax applies to particular commercial 
transactions, regardless of the nature of the service being performed: if the sexually 
explicit business has on its premises anyone performing any service for compensation in a 
nude or partially denuded state, the business is subject to the tax. Likewise, the tax is 
imposed on any provider of an escort, without reference to particular details of the 
escort's services. 
Even if the statute were not devoid of references to expressive conduct, it is still 
content-neutral in the second sense because it does not target the communicative aspect of 
speech or expressive conduct but instead addresses the secondary effects of any speech or 
expressive conduct that falls within its purview. As the record before the district court 
reflects, members of the Utah legislature heard testimony from the bill's sponsor and 
others about the relationship between sex offender recidivism and the use of the services 
to be taxed. As plaintiffs acknowledge in their opening brief, Kathy Ockey, an employee 
of the Utah Department of Corrections, testified before the House Revenue and Taxation 
Standing Committee about the cause-and-effect relationship between the use of sexually 
explicit services and the commission of sex offenses. See Aplt. Brief at 5-6; R. 133-34. 
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She testified that of the sex offenders she had dealt with in the prior eighteen years, about 
half had patronized escort services.1 SeeK. 138-39. Her testimony was based in part on a 
study by Hanson and Bussiere of recidivism risks in sex offenders that identified 
paraphilias, including use of the types of services subject to the SEBES tax, as a major 
risk factor. See Aplt. Brief at 5; R. 134. Likewise, before the Senate Revenue and 
Taxation Standing Committee, Ms. Ockey testified that "while the majority of the people 
who go out to these types of businesses don't become sex offenders, a significant portion 
of sex offenders do utilize these types of businesses, over 50%." R. 328. This testimony 
established that the purpose of the statute is not to suppress expressive conduct, but to 
address the secondary effects of the taxed businesses, commission of sexual offenses and 
sex offender recidivism chief among them. 
Although plaintiffs assert that "the tax is, by definition, content-based" (Aplt. Brief 
at 20), they fail to identify any statutory language addressing expressive conduct that 
would remove the statute from the classic definition of content neutrality. Moreover, 
while plaintiffs may disagree with the legislature's reliance on the testimony linking use 
of the taxed services with secondary effects, including the commission of sex offenses, 
they presented no testimony to the district court countering this testimony. Plaintiffs are 
in a position similar to the plaintiff in Pap's A.M.: they have "simply asserted that the 
!This testimony provides a basis for taxing the escort services under the statute. As the 
Sixth Circuit has held, nude outcall dancing implicates negative secondary effects such as 
increased opportunities to engage in prostitution and possible exposure of minors to the activity. 
See Currence v. City of Cincinnati, 28 Fed. Appx. 438, 447, 2002 WL 104778 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(Addendum B, attached). 
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[state's] evidentiary proof was lacking. In the absence of any reason to doubt it, the 
[state's] expert judgment should be credited." 529 U.S. at 298. Moreover, legislative 
bodies "are entitled to rely, in part, on 'appeal to common sense,' rather than 'empirical 
data,' at least where there is no 'actual and convincing evidence from plaintiffs to the 
contrary.'" Heideman I, 348 F.3d at 1199 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 
Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 439 (2002)). Having failed to carry their evidentiary burden in 
challenging the state's evidence of secondary effects, plaintiffs cannot show error in the 
district court's determination that the statute is content-neutral and, as a result, is entitled 
to scrutiny under the intermediate O'Brien standard. 
II. APPLYING INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY, THE DISTRICT COURT 
CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE STATUTE DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT. 
It is beyond question that a content-neutral statute is not subject to strict scrutiny, 
but is entitled to the intermediate scrutiny of O'Brien. Under O'Brien, a statute or 
regulation passes First Amendment scrutiny 
» 
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an 
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest 
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental 
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest. 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The district court concluded that the SEBES tax fulfilled each 
of the O'Brien criteria. An examination of cases construing and applying O'Brien shows 
the district court's decision to be correct. 
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A. Content Neutrality 
As discussed in Point I, above, it is well established that restrictions based on 
negative secondary effects are content-neutral. See Heideman I, 348 F.3d at 1193; Z.J. 
Gifts, 136 F.3d at 686; see also Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 294 (plurality opinion) 
(concluding that a statute regulating nude conduct, in part to combat negative secondary 
effects but not specifically targeting nudity containing an erotic message, is unrelated to 
the suppression of expression). Despite plaintiffs' claims to the contrary, plaintiffs did not 
provide any expert or other testimony casting doubt on the negative secondary effects 
identified by the testimony supporting the legislation in committee hearings. They neither 
showed that the testimony fails to support the state's rationale nor furnished evidence 
disputing the facts on which the state relied. Consequently, they did not shift the burden 
back to the state to supplement the record with additional supporting evidence. See 
Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438-39 (plurality opinion). Moreover, in Alameda Books, 
the Supreme Court explicitly rejected a requirement that defendants provide empirical 
evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of the chosen solution, stating that it has never 
demanded "such a showing, certainly not without actual and convincing evidence from 
plaintiffs to the contrary." Id. at 439. The court highlighted its "settled position" that 
legislative bodies must have a reasonable opportunity to address the negative secondary 
effects of protected speech by experimenting with solutions. Id. (citing City ofRenton v. 
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986) (quoting Young v. American Mini 
Theatres, Inc., 421 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (plurality opinion)). Having failed to meet their 
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burden of casting the state's rationale in doubt, plaintiffs have no grounds to contend that 
the statute targets the suppression of expression. 
The statute's content-neutrality is apparent when contrasted with the tax considered 
in Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook, 2007 WL 4526527 (111. App. Dec. 21, 
2007) (Addendum C, attached), submitted by plaintiffs as supplemental authority. In 
Pooh-Bah, the city and county had separate but similar ordinances that placed a tax of 
general applicability on amusements, including "sports, theaters, movies, paid television, 
circuses, and numerous other forms of entertainment unless specifically exempted." 2007 
WL 4526527 at *5. The ordinances were amended to exempt live performances in small 
venues holding not more than 750 people. However, the exemption was limited to 
performances "'commonly regarded as a part of the fine arts, such as live theater, music, 
opera, drama, ballet, modern or traditional dance, and book or poetry readings. The term 
does not include such amusements as athletic events, races or performances conducted at 
adult entertainment cabarets [as defined by local ordinance]."' Id. at *1 (quoting Chicago 
Mum Code § 4-156-01 0 (amended April 21, 1999); Cook County Amusement Tax 
Ordinance, § 2 (eff. April 1, 1999)) (alteration in original). The Illinois court concluded 
that the ordinances violated the First Amendment because "[o]ne cannot determine 
whether the operative criteria of the adult entertainment cabaret exclusions [from the tax 
exemption] apply to a particular small venue without considering the content of the small 
venue's featured speech or expressive conduct." 2007 WL 4526527 at *6. 
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Unlike the tax in Pooh-Bah, there is no evidence of a conflict between a 
constitutional provision and the SEBES tax. The tax, on its face, uniformly applies to 
commercial transactions on a content-neutral basis; it does not discriminate between 
businesses on the basis of expressive conduct. In fact, plaintiffs assert that it is overbroad 
because it can be applied to commercial theater productions, nude modeling at art 
schools, and ballet performances (see Aplt. Brief at 23-25)—the exact kinds of "fine arts" 
performances that were exempted from the amusement tax at issue in Pooh-Bah, 
rendering that tax content-based and subject to examination under a strict scrutiny 
standard. This distinction renders Pooh-Bah inapposite and of no persuasive value here. 
B. Constitutional Power of the State 
Plaintiffs have also failed to show that the statute does not lie within the state's 
constitutional power. The state's taxing authority is plenary: "Nothing in this 
Constitution may be construed to prevent the Legislature from providing by statute for 
taxes other than the property tax and for deductions, exemptions, and offsets from those 
other taxes/5 Utah Const, art. XIII, § 4, cl. 1. Neither in their summary judgment 
memoranda (R. 738-86 and 804-14) nor in their opening brief have plaintiffs challenged 
the SEBES tax on the basis that the state lacked the authority to enact it. Consequently, 
any claim that the tax lies outside the state's constitutional power has been waived. 
Moreover, this Court has recognized that "[i]n the matter of raising revenue for the 
government the court cannot set up its judgment against the Legislative judgment in 
determining who shall be required to contribute." Garrett Freight Lines, Inc. v. State Tax 
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Comm'n, 103 Utah 390, 135 P.2d 523, 525 (1943). The Garrett court observed that 
m[t]he taxing power of the state is lodged absolutely in the legislature, and, as the 
responsibility of enacting laws devolves exclusively upon that branch of the government, 
whether the right of taxation has been exercised justly or unjustly, wisely or unwisely, it 
is not for the judiciary to inquire.'" Id. (quoting Kimball v. City of Grantsville City. 19 
Utah 368, 57 P. 1,5 (1899)). The court further noted that even though the taxing power 
may be abused, "[ujnless such laws are in conflict with some constitutional provision, 
either expressly or by implication, the courts have no authority to prevent their 
execution.m Id. (quoting Kimball, 57 P. at 5). 
In short, unless the Court concludes, under the final two prongs of O'Brien, that 
the content-neutral SEBES tax does not further an important state interest, or that it 
imposes restrictions on First Amendment speech greater than necessary to further the 
state's interest, the tax is not unconstitutional and must be upheld as an appropriate 
exercise of legislative power. 
C. Government Interest and Incidental Restriction 
As to the remaining inquiries—whether the statute furthers an important or 
substantial government interest, and whether any incidental restriction on alleged First 
Amendment rights is no greater than essential to that interest—case law answers them in 
the affirmative. The government interest in protecting public safety has repeatedly been 
held of sufficient importance to support restrictions on adult entertainment and nudity, 
even where the restrictions impact expressive conduct such as nude dancing. And, "since 
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this is a content-neutral restriction, least restrictive means analysis is not required" in 
order to establish that the restriction is no greater than essential to that interest. Pap's 
A.M., 529 U.S. at 301-02 (plurality opinion). Because the statute in this case addresses 
the negative secondary effects of adult businesses and nudity on public safety, and 
because its incidental impact on expressive conduct is de minimis, it passes First 
Amendment scrutiny under O'Brien. 
"It has been by now clearly established that reducing the secondary effects 
associated with adult businesses is a substantial government interest fthat must be 
accorded high respect.'" Daytona Grand, Inc. v. City ofDaytona Beach, 490 F.3d 860, 
873-74 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 444 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted in Daytona Grand))', see 
also Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 297 (plurality opinion) ("The asserted interests of regulating 
conduct through a public nudity ban and of combating the harmful secondary effects 
associated with nude dancing are undeniably important."); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 
501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (plurality opinion) (upholding public indecency statute as a 
function of traditional police power to provide for public health, safety, and morals). 
The burden of establishing secondary effects is not high. The plurality opinion in 
Pap's A.M. noted that "[o]n this point, O'Brien is especially instructive." Pap's A.M., 529 
U.S. at 298. As the opinion observed, the O'Brien court did not require evidence that the 
destruction of draft cards would jeopardize the integrity of the Selective Service System, 
but nonetheless concluded that the government had a legitimate and substantial interest in 
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preventing and punishing such destruction: "There was no study documenting instances 
of draft card mutilation or the actual effect of such mutilation on the Government's 
asserted efficiency interests. But the Court permitted Congress to take official notice, as 
it were, that draft card destruction would jeopardize the system." Id. at 299. The Pap's 
court concluded "that this sort of leeway is appropriate in a case involving conduct" 
subject to content-neutral regulation. Id. And the Heideman I court pointed out, "In 
Barnes, the three-justice plurality (Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor 
and Kennedy) sustained a prohibition on public nudity, as applied to nude dancing, on the 
basis of the 'substantial government interest in protecting order and morality,' without the 
need for any empirical evidence regarding secondary effects." Heideman /, 348 F.3d at 
1197 (quoting Barnes, 501 U.S. at 569) (plurality opinion)). 
That the SEBES tax is targeted toward ameliorating negative secondary effects is 
established by the testimony offered in its support to the legislative committees 
considering it. As recounted in Point I, above, that testimony included identification of a 
cause-and-effect relationship between sex offender recidivism and the use of the services 
subject to the SEBES tax (R. 133-34); anecdotal evidence that approximately half of 
convicted sex offenders have patronized escort services (R. 138-39), and that a majority 
have utilized sexually explicit businesses (R. 328); and citation to a study identifying 
paraphilias, including the use of the kinds of services subject to the tax, as a major risk 
factor for the commission of sex offenses (R. 134). The testimony also addressed the 
need to generate funding to support sex offender treatment programs for the protection of 
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the public through prevention of future sex offenses (R. 130-33). The testimony 
constitutes evidence the legislators "reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem" 
they sought to address. City ofRenton, 475 U.S. at 51-52. Especially in light of 
plaintiffs' failure to counter it, it is more than sufficient to establish the importance of the 
state's interest in protecting the public against the commission of criminal sexual conduct. 
Just as precedent supports a conclusion that the statute addresses an important state 
interest, it also supports a conclusion that any incidental impact it has on expressive 
conduct is no greater than necessary to further that interest. "[T]he requirement of narrow 
tailoring is satisfied 'so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government 
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.'" Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 412 U.S. 
675, 689 (1985) (alteration in original)); see also Daytona Grand, 490 F.3d at 885 
(quoting Ward). The only impact claimed by plaintiffs is that the tax places a burden on 
their ability to perform nude dancing. However, a sexually explicit business can avoid 
ihe tax altogether through the simple expedient of requiring persons performing services 
on its premises to completely and opaquely cover the genitals, pubic region, and female 
breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola—the same restrictions 
contained in an ordinance that passed this Court's scrutiny under the state constitution in 
American Bush and that the Tenth Circuit found constitutional under the First 
Amendment in Heideman II: "Finally, as to the fourth [O'Brien] prong, the district court 
observed, and we agree, that the requirement that dancers wear 'G-strings' and 'pasties' has 
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a de minimis effect on their ability to communicate their message of eroticism." 
Heideman II, 165 Fed. Appx. at 633. See also Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 301 (plurality 
opinion) ("To be sure, requiring dancers to wear pasties and G-strings may not greatly 
reduce these secondary effects, but O'Brien requires only that the regulation further the 
interest in combating such effects."); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 572 (plurality opinion) ("It is 
without cavil that the public indecency statute is 'narrowly tailored'; Indiana's requirement 
that the dancers wear at least pasties and G-strings is modest, and the bare minimum 
necessary to achieve the State's purpose."); Daytona Grand, 490 F.3d at 885 ("it is well-
established that a nudity ordinance that imposes a minimum requirement of G-strings and 
pasties is narrowly tailored under O'Brien"). 
CONCLUSION 
O'Brien provides the correct standard for plaintiffs' challenge to the 
constitutionality of the SEBES tax under the First Amendment. As explained above, the 
tax meets each of O'Brien's criteria: it is content-neutral, it lies within the state's authority 
to enact, it addresses an important state concern, and its restrictions are no greater than 
necessary to address that concern. Plaintiffs have not shown that the tax is 
unconstitutional as applied to them, let alone unconstitutional on its face. For these 
reasons, defendants respectfully request the Court to affirm the judgment of the district 
court holding the provisions of the Sexually Explicit Business and Escort Service Tax 
constitutional under the First Amendment. 
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
Defendants request oral argument due to the complex nature of this area of First 
Amendment law. 
Dated this day of January, 2008. 
Nancy L. Kemp 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
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Background: Former nude dancers and adult 
entertainment establishment filed § 1983 action, 
challenging on First Amendment grounds city's 
enactment of ordinance banning nudity in adult 
businesses. The United States District Court for the 
District of Utah entered summary judgment in favor 
of city. Plaintiffs appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Stephanie K. 
Seymour, Circuit Judge, held that: 
(1) plaintiffs failed to present sufficient 
evidence to call into question reasonableness of 
ordinance and reliability of evidence supporting its 
enactment; 
(2) city's nudity ban presented restriction on 
First Amendment rights that was no greater than 
was necessary to further city's stated interest in 
decreasing the likelihood of unsanitary conditions, 
unlawful sexual activity and sexually fransmitted 
diseases; and 
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(3) city met its burden of proving 
reasonableness of its concerns over negative 
secondary effects of nudity in adult businesses, as 
well as reasonableness of its belief that ordinance 
would successfully address those secondary effects. 
Affirmed. 
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City, which enacted ordinance banning nudity in 
adult businesses, met its burden of proving 
reasonableness of its concerns over negative 
secondary effects of nudity in adult businesses, as 
well as the reasonableness of its belief that 
ordinance would successfully address those 
secondary effects, as was required to withstanding 
First Amendment challenge to ordinance. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 1. 
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FN* This order and judgment is not 
binding precedent, except under the 
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, 
and collateral estoppel. The court 
generally disfavors the citation of orders 
and judgments; nevertheless, an order and 
judgment may be cited under the terms and 
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 
STEPHANIE K. SEYMOUR, Circuit 
Judge. 
**1 Plaintiffs, former nude dancers and an 
adult entertainment establishment that employs 
some of them, American Bush, Inc., filed this § 1983 
action challenging on First Amendment grounds 
the enactment by South Salt Lake City ("the City") 
of an ordinance banning nudity in adult businesses. 
The district court granted the City's motion for 
summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal, and we 
affirm. 
The factual background of this action was set 
forth in a detailed and comprehensive opinion by 
this court addressing Plaintiffs' appeal of the district 
court's denial of their motion for preliminary 
injunction. Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 
F.3d 1182, 1184-87 (10th Cn.2003)(Heideman 1). 
Only facts relevant to the present appeal are 
included here. 
The City permitted nude entertainment at 
certain licensed establishments until May 2, 2001, 
when it enacted an ordinance which, among other 
things, prohibits all nude conduct in adult business 
establishments, either by employees or patrons. S. 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, ch. 5.56 (2001) (the " 
Ordinance"). This ban on nude conduct applies to 
all adult oriented businesses, not only businesses 
like Plaintiff American Bush, Inc., which provide 
live entertainment. The Ordinance does not 
prohibit erotic dancing, but instead requires 
employees engaged in erotic dancing to wear " 
G-strings" and "pasties." 
In assessing the necessity of the nudity ban and 
other restrictions set forth in the Ordinance, the City 
council reviewed numerous court opinions and 
fifty-six reports and studies from other 
municipalities regarding the negative secondary 
effects associated with adult oriented businesses. 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
Aplt.App., vol. I at 76-77, 175-81. Upon review of 
these materials, the City Council made the 
following factual findings, which are set forth in the 
preamble and "purpose and findings" section of the 
Ordinance: 
(1) Sexually oriented businesses lend 
themselves to ancillary unlawful and unhealthy 
activities that are presently uncontrolled by the 
operators of the establishments.... (2) Certain 
employees of sexually oriented businesses defined 
in this ordinance as adult theaters and cabarets 
engage in higher incidents of certain types of illicit 
sexual behavior than employees of other 
establishments. (3) Sexual acts, including 
masturbation, and oral and anal sex, occur at 
sexually oriented businesses.... (5) Persons frequent 
certain ... sexually oriented businesses for the 
purpose of engaging in sex within the premises of 
such sexually oriented businesses. (6) Numerous 
communicable diseases may be spread by activities 
occurring in sexually oriented businesses.... (7) 
According to research from the Kaiser Family 
Foundation, an estimated 650,000 to 900,000 
Americans are infected with HIV. The number of 
new HIV infections occurring each year is now 
about 41,000. Men and *630 [w]omen of all races 
are most likely to be infected by sexual contact. (8) 
A total of 1,672 AIDS cases had been reported in 
Utah as of January 1, 1999.... (9) The Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention estimate that as 
many as 1 in 3 people with HIV do not know they 
are infected. (10) The number of cases of early ... 
syphilis in the United States reported annually has 
risen with 33,613 cases reported in 1982 and 
45,200 through November of 1990.(11) The 
number of cases of gonorrhea in the United States 
reported annually remains at a high level, with over 
one-half million cases being reported in 1990.(12) 
The Surgeon General of the United States in his 
report of October 22, 1986, has advised the 
American public that AIDS and HIV infection may 
be transmitted through sexual contact, ... and from 
an infected mother to the newborn. (13) According 
to the best scientific evidence, AIDS and HIV 
infection, as well as syphilis and gonorrhea, are 
principally transmitted by sexual acts. (14) 
Sanitary conditions in some sexually oriented 
businesses are unhealthy, in part, because the 
activities conducted there are unhealthy, and, in 
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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part, because of the unregulated nature of the 
activities and the failure of the owners and the 
operators of the facilities to self-regulate those 
activities and maintain those facilities. (15) 
Numerous studies and reports have determined that 
semen is found in the areas of sexually oriented 
businesses where persons view 'adult' oriented 
films. (16) The [preceding] findings ... raise 
substantial governmental concerns. 
**2 Id. at 77-79. 
Based on these factual findings, the 
Ordinance's preamble states that it is necessary "to 
protect and preserve the health, safety, morals and 
welfare of the patrons of [adult entertainment 
establishments] as well as the citizens of the City"zV/. 
at 75, because nude conduct increases the 
prevalence of, among other things, unsanitary 
conditions, unlawful sexual activities and sexually 
transmitted diseases. The Ordinance further states 
that "[t]he general welfare, health, morals and 
safety of the citizens of the City will be promoted 
by the enactment of this Ordinance, "?7/. at 80, which 
includes a total ban on nudity in adult entertainment 
establishments. 
After the Ordinance was enacted, Plaintiffs 
filed the present action claiming that the nudity ban 
is an illegal infringement of their First Amendment 
rights. They sought a preliminary injunction, 
which the district court denied. We upheld the 
district court's ruling. Heideman I, 348 F.3d at 1200 
. After the parties conducted discovery, the City 
filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting 
among other things that Plaintiffs failed to submit 
sufficient evidence to cast doubt on the evidence 
relied on by the City in enacting its Ordinance, or 
on the reasonableness of the City's reliance on that 
evidence. The district court granted the City's 
motion. 
We review the district court's grant of summary 
judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard 
it used. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 
56(c). When applying this standard, we view the 
evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
See Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 935 
(10thCir.2005). 
In so doing, we affirm the district court's 
summary judgment, but on different*631 grounds. 
See United States v. Knox, 124 F.3d 1360, 1362 
(10th Cir.1997) (citing Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. I, 
521 F.2d 465, 472-73 (10th Cir.1975)) (appellate 
court will affirm rulings of lower court on any 
ground that finds support in record). We agree 
with the district court that the City's evidence meets 
the "reasonably believed to be relevant" standard 
set forth by the Supreme Court in City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52, 106 
S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). However, we 
disagree with the court's characterization of 
Plaintiffs' challenge, namely, that Plaintiffs' action 
simply asks the court to re-weigh the City's 
evidence de novo and assess the wisdom of the 
City's judgment. Rather, we view Plaintiffs' claims 
within the evidentiary burden-shifting framework 
set out by the Supreme Court in City of Los Angeles 
v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438-39, 122 
S.Ct. 1728, 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002) (plurality 
opinion), and City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 
277, 297-98, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 
(2000) (plurality opinion). See also Heideman I, 
348 F.3d at 1198 (stating that City's "initial burden 
to present empirical support for its conclusions 
[regarding necessity of ordinance] is minimal, but 
that plaintiffs must have an opportunity to present 
their own evidence, to which the city is then entitled 
to respond"). Under this approach, we examine 
whether Plaintiffs' evidence was sufficient to cast 
doubt on the City's evidence and its reliance thereon 
to support passage of the Ordinance. If so, 
Plaintiffs shift the burden of proof back to the City 
and foreclose summary judgment. Plaintiffs failed 
to clear this evidentiary hurdle. 
**3 [1] On appeal, Plaintiffs claim they did 
present sufficient evidence to call into question the 
reasonableness of the City's Ordinance and the 
reliability of the evidence supporting its enactment. 
Specifically, Plaintiffs point to testimony from their 
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expert witness attacking the validity of studies and 
reports from other cities relied upon by the City, as 
well as affidavits from neighboring property owners 
stating that their properties and businesses have not 
been adversely affected by their proximity to 
Plaintiff American Bush, Inc.'s establishment. 
Aplt.App., vol. I at 172-74, 186-87, 189-90. 
Plaintiffs also point to affidavits and testimony from 
the owner of American Bush, Inc., stating that his 
establishment, for the most part, has complied fully 
with existing regulations, and that banning nude 
dancing would force it to start serving alcohol in 
order to compete with other adult entertainment 
businesses providing semi-nude dancing, thereby 
increasing, not limiting, the potential for negative 
secondary effects. Id. at 138-39, 192-98. We 
conclude, however, that this evidence fails to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact as to the 
reasonableness of the City's clear interest in the 
diminishment of such secondary negative effects as 
unsanitary conditions, unlawful sexual activity, and 
the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases. 
Simply put, the record does not contain any 
evidence to counter the City's concern over 
unsanitary conditions or the possibility of public 
health concerns associated with unregulated nude 
conduct in adult business establishments. Although 
Plaintiffs submitted evidence in rebuttal of other 
negative secondary effects cited by the City in its 
Ordinance, such as diminished property values and 
crime, they presented no evidence whatsoever that 
nude conduct does not result in unsanitary 
conditions, unlawful sexual conduct, or the 
transmission of sexually transmitted diseases.FN1 
To *632 the contrary, at least one piece of evidence 
submitted by Plaintiffs could be read to support the 
reasonableness of the City's concerns. In an 
affidavit Hallard Cannon, president and chief 
executive officer of American Bush, Inc., stated that 
in December 1999, two dancer-employees at his 
establishment "were cited for violations of the 
ordinance prohibiting 'touching while performing.' 
"Id. at 196. Regardless of the final outcome of 
those citations, Mr. Cannon's statement at the very 
least suggests that nude employees were either 
simulating masturbation or engaging in physical 
contact with patrons. Both of these activities 
reasonably could relate to the City's concern over 
unsanitary conditions and unlawful sexual activity 
and their relationship to sexually transmitted 
diseases. Regardless of the ultimate probative 
value of this evidence, the reality remains that 
Plaintiffs did not submit any evidence showing that 
nude conduct does not present the kinds of negative 
secondary effects the City seeks to curtail or 
eliminate by requiring employees and patrons to 
wear some measure of clothing. Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs failed to shift the burden of proof from 
themselves back to the City. 
FN1. In their reply brief, Plaintiffs claim 
that at least some of the evidence the City 
relied upon in finding that unsanitary 
conditions are connected with nude 
entertainment involves establishments 
different from those employing Plaintiffs 
and from Plaintiff American Bush, Inc. 
Reply. Br. at 4-5. Specifically, Plaintiffs 
claim that evidence of unsanitary 
conditions and unlawful sexual activity 
associated with "peep shows" and video 
booths is not probative as to the existence 
of unsanitary conditions and unlawful 
sexual activity at nude dancing 
establishments. Plaintiffs, however, 
misunderstand the nature of their burden of 
proof. The City is permitted to rely on 
evidence of conditions at adult oriented 
businesses in general. See City of Erie v. 
Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296-97, 120 
S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000) (" 
Because the nude dancing [at plaintiffs 
establishment] is of the same character as 
the adult entertainment at issue in Renton 
[v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 
106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986), 
namely, adult motion pictures], Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc., All U.S. 
50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976) 
[same], and California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 
109, 93 S.Ct. 390, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972) 
[erotic dancing], it was reasonable for [the 
city] to conclude that such nude dancing 
was likely to produce the same secondary 
effects."). Plaintiffs' only means of 
rebutting this evidence, therefore, is to 
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submit evidence showing how and why 
their particular activities and/or 
establishments do not present similar 
concerns. Plaintiffs simply did not do this. 
**4 Their failure to present sufficient evidence 
countering that proffered by the City compels us to 
further conclude that Plaintiffs did not raise any 
genuine issues of material fact to preclude the 
district court's grant of summary judgment against 
it. In Heideman I, we stated that the City's 
Ordinance, as a "time, place and manner" 
regulation designed to ameliorate negative 
secondary effects rather than to suppress speech, is 
to be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny pursuant 
to the four part test laid out by the Supreme Court in 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 
S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). Under that 
test, the City's Ordinance will survive intermediate 
scrutiny if it "(1) [is] within the constitutional 
power of the government to adopt; (2) further[s] an 
important or substantial government interest; which 
(3) is unrelated to the suppression of expression; 
and (4) [is] no greater restriction of First 
Amendment freedom than is essential to furtherance 
of the government's purpose." Heideman 1, 348 
F.3d at 1197 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs' 
evidence is insufficient to raise genuine issues of 
material fact under the O'Brien test. 
[2][3][4] As we stated in Heideman 7,"[t]here 
is no doubt that the Ordinance is within the lawful 
powers" of the City to enact. Id. See also Pap's 
A.M., 529 U.S. at 296, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (a city's " 
efforts to protect public health and safety are clearly 
*633 within the city's [zoning] powers"). 
Therefore, the first prong of the O'Brien test is 
easily disposed of. As to the third prong, the 
Supreme "Court has consistently held that the 
control of negative secondary effects, such as those 
invoked by [the City], is unrelated to the 
suppression of the expression." Heideman I, 348 
F.3d at 1200. Hence, Plaintiffs cannot gain ground 
on the third prong.FN2 Finally, as to the fourth 
prong, the district court observed, and we agree, 
that the requirement that dancers wear "G-strings" 
and "pasties" has a de minimis effect on their ability 
to communicate their message of eroticism. 
Aplt.App., vol. Ill at 863 (citing Heideman J, 348 
F.3d at 1200). Therefore, the City's nudity ban and 
its accompanying requirement that dancers wear " 
G-strings" and "pasties" presents a restriction no 
greater than is necessary to further the City's stated 
interest in decreasing the likelihood of unsanitary 
conditions, unlawful sexual activity and sexually 
transmitted diseases. 
FN2. Plaintiffs assert, to the contrary, that 
the purpose of the Ordinance is the 
suppression of disfavored speech and that 
the amelioration of negative secondary 
effects is merely pretext for the City's 
impermissible aim. In support of their 
argument, Plaintiffs point to the deposition 
testimony of one council member and the 
City's Assistant Police Chief. Aplt.App., 
vol. Ill at 682-710. The City claims that 
transcripts of these depositions were not 
submitted to the district court. Indeed, the 
confusing nature of Plaintiffs' appendix 
makes it difficult to discern what evidence 
was, in fact, before the district court. We 
need not try to ascertain whether Plaintiffs' 
evidence, in fact, was submitted to the 
district court because even if it was, it is 
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the City's stated 
concern over negative secondary effects is 
pretext for the aim of suppressing 
protected speech. Regarding the council 
member's testimony, the Supreme Court 
has stated on several occasions that 
evidence of the impermissible motives of 
one legislator is insufficient to overcome 
the presumption that a legislative body's 
primary aim in enacting a given piece of 
legislation was not the suppression of 
disfavored speech. See City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48, 
106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). As 
to the testimony of the Assistant Police 
Chief, he was not involved in the decision 
to enact the Ordinance, and therefore any 
motive he may have had, impermissible or 
otherwise, is irrelevant to whether the 
Ordinance was enacted with the primary 
goal of suppressing speech. 
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[5] Turning at last to the second prong of 
the O'Brien test, namely, whether the City's nudity 
ban is necessary to the furtherance of eliminating 
negative secondary effects, we reiterate that the City 
bears the initial burden of proving the 
reasonableness of its concerns over negative 
secondary effects as well as the reasonableness of 
its belief that the challenged regulation will 
successfully address those secondary effects. See 
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
622, 664, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994). 
As we noted in Heideman I and as the Supreme 
Court has held time and again, however, this burden 
is not an onerous one. Heideman I, 348 F.3d at 
1197-99. The City may rely on "seemingly 
pre-packaged studies, as well as the findings of 
courts in other cases." Id. at 1197; see also Pap's 
A.M., 529 U.S. at 296, 120 S.Ct. 1382 ("in terms of 
demonstrating that ... secondary effects pose a 
threat, [a] city need not 'conduct new studies or 
produce evidence independent of that already 
generated by other cities' to demonstrate the 
problem of secondary effects, 'so long as whatever 
evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed 
to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses' 
") (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52, 106 S.Ct. 
925)). We agree with the district court that the 
City met its initial burden of presenting evidence " 
reasonably believed to be relevant." It was the 
Plaintiffs' burden then to submit evidence casting 
doubt on the reasonableness or *634 relevance of 
the City's evidence and the inferences it drew from 
that evidence. As we have already stated, Plaintiffs 
failed to do this. 
**5 In sum, we conclude that Plaintiffs have 
not shown a genuine issue of material fact as to any 
of the four O'Brien prongs, and therefore the district 
court did not err in granting the City's motion for 
summary judgment. Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
C.A.IO (Utah),2006. 
Heideman v. South Salt Lake City 
165 Fed.Appx. 627, 2006 WL 245160 (C.A.IO 
(Utah)) 
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United States Court of Appeals,Sixth Circuit. 
Greyson CURRENCE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, 
v. 
CITY OF CINCINNATI, 
Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant. 
Nos. 00-3985, 00-4041. 
Jan. 24, 2002. 
Nude outcall dancer brought action challenging 
constitutionality of city's licensing scheme for 
sexually-oriented businesses under First 
Amendment. The United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Ohio, Beckwith, J., 2000 
WL 1357918, granted summary judgment for city. 
Parties cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals held 
that: (1) action was ripe for review regardless of 
whether dancer had been denied license; (2) dancer 
had standing to challenge licensing scheme; (3) 
dancer's nude dancing performances constituted 
expression protected by First Amendment; (4) 
licensing scheme was not unconstitutional prior 
restraint; and (5) ordinance's nudity ban was 
constitutional under First Amendment. 
Affirmed. 
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*439 On Appeal from the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Ohio. 
Before BOGGS and GUY, Circuit Judges, and 
CARR, District Judge.FN* 
FN* The Honorable James G. Carr. United 
States District Judge for the Northern 
District of Ohio, sitting by designation. 
OPINION 
**1 Plaintiff-appellant Greyson Currence 
appeals the grant of summary judgment to the 
defendant, the City of Cincinnati, on Currence's 
claim for a violation of his First Amendment rights. 
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For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the 
judgment of the district court. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Currence is a male out-call dancer who owns 
and operates an exotic dance business. Currence 
provides nude, exotic dancing services in homes or 
hotel rooms for paying customers. (J.A. at 156, 
163-64). He challenges Cincinnati Municipal 
Ordinance No. 230-1996, codified at Chapter 899 
of the Municipal Code. This ordinance requires 
owners and employees of sexually-oriented 
businesses to obtain a license from the City 
Treasurer to operate or work for a sexually-oriented 
business. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL 
CODE § 899-5. It also requires payment of an 
application fee determined by the City Treasurer. 
Id. at § 899-9. The application fee currently *440 
is $250. (J.A. at 107). If the applicant is an 
employee, the Treasurer will issue a temporary 
permit so the applicant can work during review of 
the application. Id. at § 899-5(C). 
Section 899-7(A) requires the City to issue the 
license within thirty days of receiving the 
application unless: the applicant is under eighteen 
years old; the applicant or applicant's spouse is 
delinquent in paying taxes, fees, or fines; the 
applicant or applicant's spouse has been convicted 
of violating the regulation within the past two years; 
the applicant supplied false or incomplete 
information on the application; the applicant did 
not pay the application fee; the applicant's 
proposed location violated the city code; or the 
applicant violated the Ohio Criminal Code during 
specific time periods. Under § 899-13, the license 
must be renewed annually. 
If the City Treasurer decides not to issue the 
license, he or she must notify the applicant under § 
899-19(A). Section 899-19(A) gives the applicant 
ten days to respond in writing. If the applicant 
responds. § 899-19(A) requires the Treasurer to 
hold a hearing within ten days of receiving the 
written response. The applicant may, under § 
€ 2008 Thomson/West. No 
899-19(A), present witnesses and evidence at the 
hearing. If the Treasurer does not make a 
determination on the application after thirty days, 
the Treasurer must, under § 899-19(A), issue a 
temporary license. The temporary license remains 
effective, under § 899-19(A), until the later of a 
final decision, expiration of any time for appealing 
a final decision, or entry of judgment on an appeal 
by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
Section 899-19(B) provides that, once the 
Treasurer makes a final denial, the applicant may 
appeal under Chapter 2506 of the Ohio Revised 
Code. After the applicant files an appeal, the 
Treasurer must, under § 899-19(B). issue a 
temporary license, which is effective until a final 
judgment is entered by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
Section 899-22 prohibits nudity in any sexually 
oriented business. That section states, "Nudity is 
prohibited in any sexually oriented business 
including said business where no alcoholic 
beverages are sold, served or consumed, regardless 
of whether a permit has been issued pursuant to this 
Chapter 899." 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
**2 In district court, Currence asserted federal 
and state-based challenges to the ordinance: 1) the 
licensing requirement was a prior restraint on First 
Amendment protected expression; 2) the 
application fee was an unconstitutional tax on 
protected expression; 3) the ban on nudity was 
intended to prevent expressive activity from 
occurring at all; and 4) the licensing ordinance was 
vague because it lacks standards for determining 
whether the license must be granted, the process for 
appeal, and whether outcall dancing can take place. 
(J.A. at 126, 136, 139, & 142). Both Currence and 
the City moved for summary judgment. (Id. at 115). 
The district court granted the City's motion for 
summary judgment and denied Currence's motion 
for summary judgment. (Id. at 145). The district 
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court found that Currence had standing to challenge 
the license requirement, application fee, and nudity 
ban. (Id. at 123). The district court subsequently 
found that the license requirement, application fee, 
and nudity ban passed First Amendment scrutiny. ( 
Id. at 136, 138, 141). Having decided the federal 
constitutional claims, the district court declined to 
exercise jurisdiction over the state-based claims and 
dismissed them. (Id. at 144-45). 
*441 Both parties challenge the district court's 
ruling. The City contends the district court erred 
by finding Currence had standing to bring a suit for 
a First Amendment violation. Currence contends 
the district court erred by ruling that the license 
scheme and nudity ban did not violate the First 
Amendment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This court reviews a grant of a motion for 
summary judgment de novo. Smith v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 167 F.3d 286, 289 (6th Cir.1999). 
Summary judgment will be affirmed if a review of 
all the evidence in the record, in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, 
shows that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact entitling the moving party to judgment 
as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). If the 
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 
a verdict for the nonmoving party, a genuine issue 
of material fact exists. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 9\ L.Ed.2d 
202(1986). 
DISCUSSION 
I. Ripeness 
The City argues that Currence does not have 
standing to assert a facial challenge to the licensing 
ordinance because his claim is not ripe. The City 
argues that Currence neither applied for nor was 
denied a license. Currence claims he was denied a 
license. (First Br. of PI.-Appellant at 4). 
[1][2] This is a factual dispute that was not 
considered by the district court. Ripeness may, 
however, be raised for the first time on appeal. In re 
Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Board of Equalization of the 
State of Cal, 210 F.3d 999, 1006 (9th Cir.2000) 
(citing Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., 509 U.S. 43, 
58 n. 18, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993)). 
If Currence was denied a license, his claim 
clearly is ripe. If Currence was not denied a 
license, he is making a facial challenge, which 
presents ripeness concerns. 
**3 "The ripeness doctrine exists to ensure that 
courts decide 'only existing, substantial 
controversies, not hypothetical questions or 
possibilities.' " Dixie Fuel Co. v. Commissioner oj 
Soc. Sec, 171 F.3d 1052, 1057 (6th Cir.1999) 
(quoting City Communications, Inc. v. City oj 
Detroit, 888 F.2d 1081, 1089 (6th Cir.1989)). It 
centers on whether the facts are developed 
sufficiently to permit determination. Hallandale 
Prof. Fire Fighters v. City of Hallandale, 922 F.2d 
756, 760 (11th Cir.1991). 
A ripeness inquiry requires consideration of: 
1) the likelihood that the injury alleged by Currence 
will ever occur; 2) whether the issues are fit for 
judicial determination; and 3) the hardship to the 
parties from refusing consideration. Adult Video 
Ass'n v. United States Dept. of Justice, 71 F.3d 563, 
568 (6th Cir. 1995). 
A case, generally, is more ripe if it involves 
questions of law and few contingent future events. 
New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 
F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir.1995). Ripeness 
analysis is relaxed for First Amendment cases 
involving a facial challenge to a regulation because 
courts see a need to prevent the chilling of 
expressive activity. Id. at 1500. 
Currence passes the three-prong test for 
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ripeness. It is likely that an injury will occur. 
While it is possible Currence would be able to gain 
a license, the City, which closely has monitored and 
disapproves of Currence's activities, has given no 
evidence of an inclination to grant a license. 
Because nudity is a major component of Currence's 
dance routine, the nudity ban, *442 moreover, 
would injure Currence's ability to conduct his 
activities. It, therefore, appears that an injury to 
Currence is likely. 
The issues are ready for judicial determination. 
While there is disagreement over whether Currence 
was denied a license, the case turns on issues of 
law, because the central dispute is whether the 
regulation violates the First Amendment. See id. at 
1499; see also Amelkin v. McCJure, No. 94-6161, 
1996 WL 8112, 1996 U.S.App. LEXIS 1414, at 
*15 (6th Cir. Jan. 9, 1996) ("[T]his case turns 
largely on matters of law and not on contingent 
matters of fact; at the heart of this controversy is 
whether § 189.635(6) violates the First Amendment. 
Withholding judicial relief may impose an 
undue hardship on Currence. The hardship issue 
centers on whether the City's action threatens " 'a 
direct and immediate' " harm. El Dia, Inc. v. 
Hernandez Colon, 963 F.2d 488, 496 (1st Cir. 1992) 
(citation omitted). Currence faces a direct and 
immediate dilemma in how to conduct his dance 
routine within the boundaries of the law. 
Admittedly, this court has stated, "the caution and 
uncertainty caused by withholding judicial relief at 
this time is not an 'undue hardship.' Individuals 
who choose to conduct their affairs along the 
boundaries of the criminal law will necessarily incur 
some risks concerning the legality of their conduct." 
Adult Video Ass'n, 71 F.3d at 568 (citing Polykofj 
v. Collins, 816 F.2d 1326, 1340 (9th Cir. 1987)). It 
appears, however, at least with the respect to the 
nudity ban, that the hardship is not uncertain. 
**4 Especially in light of relaxed ripeness 
standards for First Amendment facial challenges, 
this case is ripe for judicial review. 
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II. Standing 
Standing requires: 1) an injury in fact suffered 
by the plaintiff; 2) a causal connection between the 
injury and the conduct complained of; and 3) the 
likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a 
decision in plaintiffs favor. See Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 
S.Ct.2130, 119L.Ed.2d351 (1992). 
[3] The district court interpreted the City's 
standing argument to center on the first 
requirement-an injury in fact. The district court 
stated that the City essentially argued that Currence 
could not suffer a First Amendment injury if his 
activities were not protected by the First 
Amendment. (J.A. at 119). To be protected by the 
First Amendment, one's conduct must constitute 
expression. But the First Amendment does not 
protect all expression. Currence's conduct must 
constitute a type of expression protected by the First 
Amendment for him to have standing.FN1 
FN1. The City argues that this court should 
deny standing for prudential reasons. The 
City argues that it would be wise for this 
court to exercise judicial self-restraint 
under Natural Resources Defense Council 
v. Jamison, 787 F.Supp. 231, 235 
(D.D.C.1990), because Currence is using 
the judiciary to facilitate the sale of 
personal, totally nude homosexual 
interactive conduct. 
The court m Jamison states: 
As to the prudential limits on the court's 
exercise of its jurisdiction, which may require a 
denial of standing "if as a matter of judicial 
self-restraint it seems wise not to entertain the case," 
... plaintiff "must plausibly ... assert that the injury 
is arguably within the zone of interests protected or 
regulated by the law on which the complaint is 
founded." ..."Essentially, the standing question in 
such cases is whether the constitutional or statutory 
provision on which the claims rest can properly be 
understood as granting persons in the plaintiffs 
position a right to judicial relief." 
Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500, 
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95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Action 
Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphia 
v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931, 936 (D.C.Cir.1986); 13 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
JURISDICTION 2D § 3531). 
The City's argument is not well-taken. The 
City cites no Sixth Circuit precedent applying these 
prudential concerns to deny standing. The City 
quotes one portion of Young v. Klutznick, 652 F.2d 
617, 623 (6th Cir.1981), which simply states that " 
courts have developed rules to limit their exercise 
of jurisdiction in particular cases when prudential 
considerations militate against invocation of the 
judicial process." The City provides no statements 
addressing the standard stated in Jamison. 
It seems clear, furthermore, that the claimed 
injury is within the zone of interests regulated by 
the law challenged in the complaint. Currence's 
business, the sale of erotic dancing performances, is 
regulated by the law because the law imposes 
certain restrictions or duties on Currence. We 
decline, accordingly, to forego consideration of the 
merits on the basis of prudential reasons. 
*443 A. Whether Currence's Conduct Constitutes 
Expression 
[4] The City argues, as it contended before the 
district court, that Currence's "sales were cnot 
expressive conduct protected by the First 
Amendment but rather are unprotected recreational, 
sexual escort services.' " (Appellee Br. at 13 
(citing City's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 
12)). In this court, the City claims that Currence 
engages in non-expressive sexually-oriented 
conduct. 
The district court stated, "The City does not 
appear to argue that Plaintiffs activity is merely 
non-expressive conduct. Rather, the City's choice 
of words suggests that it believes that Plaintiff 
engages in obscenity." (J.A. at 121). By only 
discussing whether Currence's conduct constituted 
obscenity-a type of expression not protected by the 
First Amendment-the district court did not address 
the initial issue of whether Currence's activity 
involves expression under the First Amendment. 
This court has held that the issue of whether 
erotic dancing constitutes expression is 
fact-specific. DLS. Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 107 
F.3d 403, 409 (6th Cir.1997) ("We consider it 
appropriate to determine whether speech is 
implicated on a case-by-case basis as a question of 
fact, given the broad range of activities that may be 
governed by this ordinance or laws similar to it."). 
In his concurrence to Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 
501 U.S. 560, 581, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 
504 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring), Justice Souter 
stated that, while not all dancing is expressive, a 
dance performed by a nude or nearly so dancer 
carries the message and expressive content of 
eroticism unless shown otherwise. The Supreme 
Court subsequently has stated that erotic, nude 
dancing is expression, at least in a public place. 
City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289, 120 
S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000). 
The record, including a police surveillance 
tape, shows that Currence engages in nude dancing. 
Based on Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court 
precedent and Justice Souter's concurrence, 
Currence's activity is expressive for First 
Amendment purposes. 
B. Whether Currence's Conduct is Expression 
Protected by the First Amendment 
**5 [5] The City alternatively argues that 
Currence sells sexually-oriented expressive conduct 
that is not protected by the First Amendment. The 
City contends that the district court incorrectly 
redefined the City's argument. The City argues that 
it did not contend, before the district court, that 
Currence engaged in obscenity.FN2 The *444 City 
contends that it argued Currence engaged in 
unprotected recreational, sexual escort services. 
The district court, therefore, did not address the 
argument presented to this court. 
FN2. The district court characterized the 
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City's argument as stating the City believed 
Currence engaged in obscenity. (J.A. at 
121). The district court subsequently held 
that Currence's activities were not obscene. 
(Id. at 123) (citing Sable Communications 
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 
2829, 106L.Ed.2d93(1989)). 
The City classifies Currence's activities as 
personal sexually-oriented recreational escort 
services and outcall exotic dance. The City argues. 
"If both recreational dancing and personal escort 
services are not protected by the First Amendment, 
personal sexually-oriented recreational escort 
services such as outcall exotic dance are also not 
protected by the First Amendment." (Final Br. of 
Def-Appellee at 17). 
As noted, the Supreme Court has held that 
nude, sexually-oriented dancing is protected under 
the First Amendment. City of Erie, supra, 529 U.S. 
at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382 ("[N]ude dancing of the type 
at issue here is expressive conduct, although we 
think that it falls only within the outer ambit of the 
First Amendment's protection.") (citing Barnes v. 
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66, 111 S.Ct. 
2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991); Schad v. Mount 
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68 
L.Ed.2d671 (1981)). 
The City distinguishes the instant case from 
City of Erie on the basis that Currence's activity 
occurs in private settings, rather than in public 
places. Because the activity occurs in private, the 
City argues Currence's services are of the escort 
nature and fall outside the First Amendment. The 
City calls attention to Judge Posner's concurrence in 
Miller v. City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1101 
(7th Cir.1990) (Posner, J., concurring), in which he 
suggested that the smaller the audience for an erotic 
dance, the less the First Amendment protection for 
the performance. Id. 
[6] Because the Supreme Court has not 
distinguished between erotic dancing before private 
or public audiences, we apply the general rule set 
forth in City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 
1382, and hold that erotic dancing is expression 
protected by the First Amendment. Currence thus 
has standing to challenge the ordinance because his 
nude dancing performances constitute expression 
protected by the First Amendment. 
III. Constitutionality of the Ordinance 
A. Licensing Scheme 
[7] Currence argues that the licensing scheme 
unlawfully imposes a prior restraint on First 
Amendment expression. Currence contends that 
the licensing scheme impermissibly restricts speech 
on the basis of content and the speaker's identity 
and is, therefore, not content-neutral. Currence 
argues that, because the licensing scheme requires 
only sexually-oriented businesses and their 
employees, rather than all businesses and 
employees, to obtain licenses, the scheme is an 
unconstitutional prior restraint. 
The City contends that, as a general 
proposition, adult sexually-oriented businesses may 
be regulated. The City argues that 
sexually-oriented conduct in private places creates a 
propensity for prostitution, obscenity, and 
transmission of disease, as well as a heightened risk 
that minors will be exposed to these conditions. 
The City argues it has a compelling interest in 
preventing these conditions and risks, so that its 
ordinance does not impose an unlawful prior 
restraint on freedom of expression. 
**6 In Nightclubs, Inc. v. City of Paducah, 202 
F.3d 884 (6th Cir.2000), this court *445 stated the 
standard for analyzing whether an ordinance is a 
constitutionally invalid prior restraint. The court 
stated: 
Thus, a licensing scheme must remove 
standardless discretion from government officials 
and contain two procedural safeguards: (1) the 
decision whether to issue a license must be made 
within a specified brief period, and the status quo 
must be maintained during that period and during 
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judicial review, and (2) there must be a "guarantee 
of prompt judicial review." 
Id. at 890 (citing East Brooks Books, Inc. v. 
City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220, 225 (6th Cir.1995)). 
The Cincinnati ordinance does not vest unbridled 
discretion in government officials. The Treasurer 
must issue a license if the applicant meets all of the 
specified criteria, which are objective in character. 
As the district court stated, there is no "room for 
value judgments in determining whether or not to 
issue the license." (J.A. at 129). 
The decision whether to issue a license is to be 
made within a specified and brief period of time. 
The status quo is maintained during that period and 
while judicial review, if any, occurs. The 
Treasurer must issue the license within thirty days, 
and unlike the ordinance in Nightclubs, an applicant 
is not required to pass health and fire inspections as 
a condition precedent to being licensed. 
The applicant must, under § 899-7(A), obtain a 
certificate of compliance under the zoning code. 
The zoning code, however, requires issuance of a 
compliance certificate within ten days of filing. If 
zoning requirements are not met, the business may 
operate during the pendency of an appeal.FN3 As 
the district court determined, the maximum period 
of delay resulting from the zoning requirements, 
under Cincinnati Municipal Code § 1477-421, 
would be seven to ten days for the initial zoning 
determination, thirty days for a final decision from 
the Zoning Board of Appeals, and then thirty days 
from the filing of a notice of appeal. 
FN3. The City conceded, before the 
district court, that the zoning requirements 
did not apply to Currence because he 
operated his business from his home. The 
district court held, however, that even if 
the zoning conditions applied to Currence, 
unreasonable delay would not result. 
Because the filing of a notice of appeal permits 
operation, the district court read the zoning and 
licensing ordinances together to mean that a copy of 
the notice of appeal satisfies the certificate of 
Page 9 
compliance requirement under the licensing 
ordinance. (J.A. at 133). The applicant would thus 
have to wait a maximum of seventy days to begin 
operation when considering the zoning and 
licensing ordinances together because it could take 
a maximum of forty days to obtain a zoning 
certificate of compliance or notice of appeal and a 
maximum of thirty days to obtain a permanent or 
temporary license. (J.A. at 132-33). 
Because it appears that a period of at least 
seventy-four days constitutes a reasonable amount 
of time to begin operation, the City's licensing 
scheme passes the first prong of a prior restraint 
analysis. See East Brooks Books, 48 F.3d at 225 
(discussing United States v. Thirty-Seven 
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 28 
L.Ed.2d 822 (1971)). 
**7 The licensing scheme also provides for 
prompt judicial review. The court, in Nightclubs, 
acknowledged that this is a difficult task for cities 
because they cannot control judicial dockets. 
Nightclubs, 202 F.3d at 893. To alleviate this 
problem, the court suggested that a city enact an 
ordinance that: 1) requires a license to issue if the 
court does not decide the issue within *446 a 
certain period of time; or 2) issues a provisional 
license to businesses or employees who seek 
judicial review. Id. at 894 (citations omitted). The 
City's ordinance does the latter-it issues a license 
pending judgment by a court. 
The licensing ordinance, thus, passes the prior 
restraint analysis set forth in Nightclubs.FN4 
FN4. Currence challenged the application 
fee as an unconstitutional tax before the 
lower court. Currence also challenged the 
licensing scheme as vague before the 
district court. Currence makes no mention 
of these arguments on appeal. 
B. Nudity Ban 
[8] Currence argues that the nudity ban is not 
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content-neutral because the purpose of the 
ordinance is to prevent expressive activity from 
occurring at all. Currence also argues that his 
expressive activity is entitled to more protection 
because it occurs primarily in homes. Currence 
finally argues that the district court misapplied City 
of Erie, supra. Currence contends the Supreme 
Court concluded that requiring dancers to remain 
minimally clothed only had a de minimis effect on 
expression. 
The City argues that the ban does not target 
expression. The City contends that the Supreme 
Court has held that the right to sell 
sexually-oriented services, while nude, does not 
override the government interests in controlling 
adverse secondary effects. 
In City of Erie, the Supreme Court discussed 
the framework for analyzing ordinances addressing 
public nudity. The Court stated that a more 
stringent level of scrutiny applies when the 
ordinance is related to the suppression of 
expression. 529 U.S. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382. 
When the regulation is not related to suppressing 
expression, the regulation must satisfy the less 
stringent standard set forth in United States v. 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 
672(1968). 
Here, the ordinance appears to be unrelated to 
the suppression of expression. The ordinance 
expresses reasonable concerns about the secondary 
effects of sexually-oriented business such as: 
deleterious effect on surrounding businesses and 
residential areas, increased crime, diminution of 
property values, connection to unlawful sexual 
activities, increased unhealthful conduct, sexual 
transmission of disease, and harmful effects to 
children. (J.A. at 66-67). Similar to the ordinance 
at issue in City of Erie, this ordinance "does not 
attempt to regulate the primary effects of the 
expression, i.e., the effect on the audience of 
watching nude erotic dancing, but rather the 
secondary effects, such as the impacts on public 
health, safety, and welfare...." 529 U.S. at 292, 120 
S.Ct. 1382. 
Under O'Brien, the ordinance must: 1) be 
within the constitutional power of the city to enact; 
2) further an important or substantial government 
interest; 3) be unrelated to the suppression of 
expression; and 4) establish a restriction that is no 
greater than is necessary to further the government 
interest. Id. at 296-301,120 S.Ct. 1382. The 
district court did not discuss all four prongs but, 
instead, focused on whether extending the 
ordinance's nudity proscription is overly restrictive. 
**8 The ordinance is within the City's 
governmental power because the protection of 
health and safety are within a government's police 
powers. Id. at 296, 120 S.Ct. 1382 ("Here, Erie's 
efforts to protect public health and safety are clearly 
within the city's police powers."). Important 
governmental interests are at stake, namely: 
controlling adverse secondary effects related to 
public nudity such as prostitution, obscenity,*447 
transmission of disease, and danger to minors. 
These interests were endorsed in City of Erie. Id. (" 
The asserted interests of regulating conduct through 
a public nudity ban and of combating the harmful 
secondary effects associated with nude dancing are 
undeniably important."). 
To demonstrate that the asserted secondary 
effects are a threat, "the city need not wconduct new 
studies or produce evidence independent of that 
already generated by other cities' ....'so long as 
whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably 
believed to be relevant to the problem that the city 
addresses.' " Id. (quoting Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52, 106 S.Ct. 925, 
89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986)). The City relied on reviews 
of the secondary effects of sexually-oriented 
businesses in thirteen other cities. (J.A. at 66). 
The City thus demonstrated that the asserted 
secondary effects properly are subject to legislative 
deterrence. 
The City's ordinance furthers its legitimate 
governmental interests. As the Court stated in City 
of Erie,"[I]t is evident that, since crime and other 
public health and safety problems are caused by the 
presence of nude dancing establishments ..., a ban 
on such nude dancing would further [the] interest m 
preventing such secondary effects." Id. at 300-01, 
120 S.Ct. 1382. 
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The ordinance also is unrelated to the END OF DOCUMENT 
suppression of expression. The ordinance aims to 
regulate the secondary effects of the expression, not 
the expression or its primary effects such as "the 
effect on the audience of watching nude erotic 
dancing." A/, at 291, 120 S.Ct. 1382. 
The district court only expressed concern with 
the fourth element of O'Brien: 
Not all of the identifiable secondary effects of 
sexually oriented businesses are implicated by nude 
outcall dancing. For instance, the Court doubts 
seriously that nude outcall dancing to private homes 
would ever have a deleterious effect on 
neighborhood property values or cause urban blight. 
On the other hand, opportunities to engage in 
prostitution are certainly increased in this setting as 
are the chances that minors will be exposed to this 
activity. 
(J.A. at 140-41). 
The court ultimately concluded that the City's 
interest only was diminished slightly and O'Brien 
was satisfied. 
The district court's rationale was correct. 
Certain secondary effects remain a concern with 
outcall services, such as: prostitution, exposure to 
minors, and obscenity. The City has an important 
interest in preventing such effects, and the nudity 
ban furthers this interest. The City has not 
established a restriction that is greater than is 
necessary to further the government interest. The 
nudity ban is constitutional under the First 
Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
**9 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the 
judgment of the district court. 
C.A.6 (Ohio),2002. 
Currence v. City of Cincinnati 
28 Fed.Appx. 438, 2002 WL 104778 (C.A.6 (Ohio)) 
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Appellate Court of Illinois,First District. 
POOH-BAH ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a Crazy 
Horse Too, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
The COUNTY OF COOK; Barbara Bruno, Director 
of the Cook County Department of Revenue; and 
The City of Chicago, Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 1-05-2924. 
Dec. 21,2007. 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, 
Alexander P. White, Judge Presiding. 
Justice O'MARA FROSSARD delivered the 
opinion of the court: 
*1 Plaintiff Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc., appeals 
the orders that granted the motions to dismiss filed 
by defendants the County of Cook and the director 
of its department of revenue (the County), and the 
City of Chicago (the City). Plaintiffs dismissed 
action sought declaratory and injunctive relief 
against defendants, challenging the constitutionality 
of their amusement tax exemptions for small, fine 
arts venues that exclude adult entertainment cabaret 
s. On appeal plaintiff contends that the tax 
exemption scheme: (1) violates the first amendment 
of the United States Constitution; (2) violates the 
free speech clause o f the Illinois Constitution; (3) is 
overbroad; (4) is vague: and (5) violates the 
uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution. For 
the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of 
the circuit court. 
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BACKGROUND 
The City imposes on patrons of any amusement 
a tax of 8% on the admission price to enter, witness, 
view, or participate in any amusement within its 
boundaries. Chicago Municipal Code § 
4-156-020(A) (amended December 15, 2004). The 
County imposes a virtually identical tax at a rate of 
3%. Cook County Amusement Tax Ordinance, § 3 
(eff April 1, 1999). 
The City defines amusement as: 
"any exhibition, performance, presentation or 
show for entertainment puiposes, * * * including, 
but not limited to, any theatrical, dramatic, musical 
or spectacular performance, promotional show, 
motion picture show, flower, poultry or animal 
show, animal act, circus, rodeo, athletic contest, 
sport, game or similar exhibition [or] * * * any paid 
television programming."Chicago Municipal Code § 
4-156-010(2006). 
The County's definition of amusement is 
similar. Cook County Amusement Tax Ordinance, § 
2 (eff. April 1, 1999). 
Effective January 1999, the City and County 
amended their amusement tax ordinances, with the 
intent to foster the production of live performances 
that offer theatrical, musical or cultural enrichment. 
See City Council Journal Entry, November 12, 
1998, amending § 4-156-020(D); Cook County 
Board of Commissioner's Resolution, November 17, 
1998, amending the amusement tax ordinance. 
Specifically, the City and County exempted from 
the amusement tax live theatrical, live musical or 
other live cultural performances that take place in a 
space with a maximum capacity of not more than 
750 people (hereinafter. the small-venue 
exemption). Chicago Municipal Code § 
4-156-020(D)(l) (2006); Cook County Amusement 
Tax Ordinance, § 3D(1) (eff. April 1, 1999). To 
clarify the exemption, amendments were passed in 
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April 1999 defining live theatrical, live musical or 
other live cultural performance as: 
"a live performance in any of the disciplines 
which are commonly regarded as part of the fine 
arts, such as live theater, music, opera, drama, 
comedy, ballet, modern or traditional dance, and 
book or poetry readings. The term does not include 
such amusements as athletic events, races or 
performances conducted at adult entertainment 
cabarets [as defined by local ordinance]." Chicago 
Municipal Code § 4-156-010 (amended April 21, 
1999); Cook County Amusement Tax Ordinance, § 
2(eff.Aprill, 1999). 
*2 The following definitions are contained in 
section 16-16-030 of the City's adult use ordinance: 
" 'Adult entertainment cabaret' means a public 
or private establishment which: (i) features topless 
dancers, strippers, male or female impersonators; 
(ii) not infrequently, features entertainers who 
display 'specified anatomical areas'; or (iii) features 
entertainers who by reason of their appearance or 
conduct perform in a manner which is designed 
primarily to appeal to the prurient interest of the 
patron or entertainers who engage in, or engage in 
the explicit simulation of, 'specified sexual 
activities.' 
'Specified sexual activities' means and is 
defined as: 
1. Human genitals in a state of sexual 
stimulation or arousal; 
2. Acts o f human masturbation, sexual 
intercourse or so do my; 
3. Fondling or other erotic touching of human 
genitals, public region, buttock or female breast. 
'Specified anatomical areas' means and is 
defined as: 
1. Less than completely and opaquely covered: 
(a) human genitals, pubic region, (b) buttock and (c) 
female breast below a point immediately above the 
top of the areola; and 
2. Human male genitals m a discemibly turgid 
state, even if completely and opaquely covered." 
Chicago Municipal Code § 16-16-030 (2006). 
Similar definitions of these same three terms 
are contained in the County's zoning ordinance. 
Cook County Zoning Ordinance of 2001, art. 14.2.1 
(2006). 
In 2001, plaintiff filed this action for 
declaratory and injunctive relief against the County. 
Plaintiff operates an adult entertainment cabaret in 
Chicago under the name Crazy Horse Too, which 
has a maximum capacity of less than 750 persons. 
Crazy Horse Too features live performances of 
exotic dancing by scantily clad women, who, during 
their dances, become semi-clothed in that they 
remove much of their clothing and display certain 
specified anatomical areas. Plaintiffs complaint 
challenged the provision of the small-venue 
exemption that excludes performances conducted at 
adult entertainment cabarets. Plaintiff argued the 
exclusion violates the first amendment of the United 
States Constitution and the free speech clause o f 
the Illinois Constitution. The City filed a motion to 
intervene as a party defendant because its 
amusement tax and small-venue exemption are 
similar to the County's. The circuit court granted the 
motion. 
Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, 
adding first amendment and free speech clause 
claims against the City. According to the complaint, 
after the small-venue exemptions were enacted, 
plaintiff stopped adding the amusement tax to the 
admission fee it charged and began paying the tax 
itself under protest. Plaintiff sought a refund of 
those taxes, arguing that the small-venue 
exemptions' exclusion of patrons of performances 
conducted at adult entertainment cabarets 
impermissibly discriminated on the basis of content, 
facially and as applied, against exotic dancing and 
other performances with adult content in violation 
of the first amendment and the free speech clause. 
Plaintiff also argued that the adult entertainment 
cabaret exclusions were, facially and as applied, 
overbroad and vague in violation of the first 
amendment and free speech clause. 
*3 The City and County moved to dismiss 
plaintiffs claims under section 2-615 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2002)), 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. The circuit court granted the motions to 
dismiss, concluding that the exclusion of adult 
entertainment cabarets from the small-venue 
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exemptions did not violate the first amendment, that 
the free speech clause of the Illinois Constitution 
did not provide any greater protection in this type of 
case, and that the tax exemption schemes were 
neither overbroad nor vague. Plaintiff filed a motion 
to reconsider, which was denied by the circuit court. 
Plaintiff also filed a third amended complaint, 
containing two claims under the uniformity clause 
of the Illinois Constitution. The City then moved to 
dismiss, and the County joined the motion. The 
circuit court dismissed the new claims because it 
found that real and substantial differences existed 
between small, fine arts venues and adult 
entertainment cabarets, that similar distinctions for 
tax purposes have been upheld, and t hat the 
differences bo re a reasonable relationship to the 
small-venue exemption's purpose of enhancing the 
City's and County's reputations in the fine arts. 
Plaintiff then appealed. 
ANALYSIS 
The circuit court granted defendants' motions 
to dismiss because plaintiff failed to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted. In ruling on such 
a motion, the court considers all well-pleaded facts 
and reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff. Jackim v. CCLake, Inc., 
363 Ill.App.3d 759, 760-61 (2005). The only 
question presented by a section 2-615 motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is 
whether sufficient facts are stated in the complaint 
which, if true, could entitle the plaintiff to relief. 
Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 I11.2d 469, 
488 (1994). Our review of a dismissal under section 
2-615 is de novo. Jackim, 363 Ill.App.3d at 760. 
First Amendment 
The first amendment to the United States 
Constitution, made applicable to the states through 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, prohibits governmental action that 
abridges freedom of speech. U.S. Const., amends. I, 
XIV; People v. Alexander, 204 IU.2d 472, 476 
(2003). First amendment protections are not limited 
to the written or spoken word, but may also extend 
to expressive conduct. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397, 404, 105 L.Ed.2d 342, 353, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 
2539 (1989). While erotic dancing of the sort 
practiced at Crazy Horse Too enjoys constitutional 
protection as expressive conduct, it falls "only 
within the outer ambit of the First Amendment's 
protect ion."^ of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 
277, 289, 146 L.Ed.2d 265, 278, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 
1391 (2000). 
Plaintiff raises both facial and as-applied 
constitutional challenges to the provisions in 
defendants' tax schemes that exclude adult 
entertainment cabarets from the amusement tax 
small-venue exemption. Plaintiff argues that the 
provisions are content-based on their face and the 
exclusion of performances conducted at adult 
entertainment cabarets applies to plaintiffs small 
venue by reference to the expressive activity 
performed inside. A party raising a facial challenge 
to a law bears the heavy burden of demonstrating 
that it is unconstitutional under any set of 
circumstances, whereas a party raising an as-applied 
challenge need only show that, although the law 
may be constitutionally applied in most 
circumstances, it was specifically applied to him in 
an unconstitutional manner. People v. Garvin, 219 
I11.2dl04, 117(2006). 
*4 "It is settled that speech can be effectively 
limited by the exercise of the taxing power "Speiser 
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460, 
1468, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1338 (1958), citing Grosjean 
v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 80 L.Ed. 660, 
56 S.Ct. 444 (1936). Although it is constitutional to 
tax first amendment activities in a genuinely 
nondiscriminatory fashion {Arkansas Writers' 
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229, 95 
L.Ed.2d 209, 219, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 1727 (1987)). 
the Supreme Court in Leathers v. Medlock, 499 
U.S. 439, 113 L.Ed.2d 494, 111 S.Ct. 1438 (1991). 
identified three situations where a tax imposed by 
government will trigger strict scmtiny under the 
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first amendment. Absent a compelling justification, 
the government may not exercise its taxing power to 
(1) single out the press, (2) target a small group of 
speakers, or (3) discriminate on the basis of the 
content of taxpayer speech. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 
447, 113 L.Ed.2d at 503-04, 111 S.Ct. at 1443-44. 
Strict scrutiny requires the government to show that 
the law is both necessary to serve a compelling 
interest and narrowly tailored to achieve that end. 
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group. Inc., 
529 U .S. 803, 813, 146 L.Ed.2d 865, 879, 120 
S.Ct. 1878, 1886(2000). 
In explaining the problematic nature of 
differential taxation, the Supreme Court, in the 
context of a discriminatory tax on a certain segment 
of print media, stated that the general applicability 
of any burdensome tax helps to ensure that it will be 
met with widespread opposition. But when such a 
law applies only to a single constituency, it is 
insulated from political constraint. Minneapolis Star 
c£ Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner oj 
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585, 75 L.Ed.2d 295, 
304-05, 103 S.Ct. 1365, 1371-72 (1983). 
Speaker-based or content-based taxes, absent a 
compelling government interest, will be struck 
down as a form of censorship. Murdoch, v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 
116, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 1300, 63 S.Ct. 870, 876 (1943) 
("a community may not suppress, or the state tax, 
the dissemination of views because they are 
unpopular, annoying or distasteful"); Grosjean, 297 
U.S. at 244, 80 L.Ed, at 666, 56 S.Ct. at 447 (a 
gross receipts tax derived from advertisements 
carried in newspapers operated as a restraint on 
speech). 
The Supreme Court has also recognized that 
content-based tax exemptions operate to suppress 
speech and implicate strict scrutiny. In Speiser, 357 
U.S. at 518, 2 L.Ed.2d at 1468, 78 S.Ct. at 1338, 
where the Court deemed unconstitutional a 
California tax provision requiring veterans to sign a 
loyalty oath in order to claim a property tax 
exemption, the Court noted, "[i]t cannot be gainsaid 
that a discriminatory denial of a tax exemption for 
engaging in speech is a limitation on free speech." 
Similarly, Illinois courts have recognized the 
suppressive nature of selective taxes and selective 
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tax exemptions, holding that they are limited by the 
first amendment. American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. 
City of Warrenville, 321 Ill.App.3d 349, 354 (2001) 
(noting that a selective amusement tax on free 
speech will trigger heightened scrutiny under the 
first amendment if it discriminates on the basis of 
content); Satellink of Chicago, Inc. v. City oj 
Chicago, 168 Ill.App.3d 689, 696 (1988) 
(amusement tax amendment that targeted 
subscription television by exempting cable 
television would not withstand strict scrutiny 
analysis). 
*5 The City's and County's amusement taxes 
are taxes of general applicability, which apply to 
sports, theaters, movies, paid television, circuses, 
and numerous other forms of entertainment unless 
specifically exempted. The taxes do not single out 
the press for special treatment or target a small 
group of speakers. However, the third circumstance 
that triggers heightened scrutiny analysis under the 
first amendment-that the tax discriminates on the 
basis of the content of the speech-is an issue in this 
case. 
Defendants argue that their amusement tax 
schemes should be deemed content-neutral because 
they were not enacted with the purpose of 
discriminating against any particular expression. 
According to defendants, the adult entertainment 
cabaret exclusions were not enacted to suppress 
protected expression but, rather, because that type 
of venue does not further the legitimate 
governmental policy of encouraging, through 
subsidization, small-venue fine arts performances 
that will enhance the City's and County's reputations 
in the fine arts. Because those policy interests are 
not related to the content of the message being 
expressed, defendants contend, their tax schemes 
should be considered content-neutral and, thus, 
strict scrutiny should not apply. 
Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations 
A regulation is content-neutral so long as it is " 
'justified without reference to the content of the 
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regulated speech.' " Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
491 U.S. 781, 791, 105 L.Ed.2d 661, 675, 109 S.Ct. 
2746, 2753 (1989), quoting Clark v. Community for 
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 82 
L.Ed.2d 221, 227, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3069 (1984). 
Generally, laws that by their terms distinguish 
favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis 
of the ideas or views expressed are content-based. 
People v. Jones, 188 I11.2d 352, 358-60 (1999) 
(statute that banned the emission of loud amplified 
sound from vehicles but exempted advertising was 
content-based and violated the first amendment). 
Laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on 
speech without reference to the ideas or views 
expressed are in most instances content-neutral. 
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal 
Communications Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 643-44, 
129 L.Ed.2d 497, 518-19, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2459-60 
(1994) (strict scmtiny did not apply to requirement 
that cable systems must carry full power local 
broadcast stations because the provisions depended 
only on the operator's channel capacity, not the 
content of programming). 
The first amendment does not generally 
countenance governmental control over the content 
of messages expressed by private individuals 
because each person should decide for himself or 
herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of 
expression, consideration, and adherence. Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc., 512 U.S. at 641, 129 
L.Ed.2d at 517, 114 S.Ct. at 2458. Thus, 
content-based regulations are presumptively invalid 
(R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 
377, 382, 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 317, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 
2542 (1992)) and will be upheld only if necessary 
to serve a compelling governmental interest and 
narrowly drawn to achieve that end (Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270, 70 L.Ed.2d 440, 
447-48, 102 S.Ct 269, 274 (1981)). 
*6 Although the government's purpose is the 
controlling consideration in determining content 
neutrality, the mere assertion of a content-neutral 
purpose will not save a law "which, on its face, 
discriminates based on content "Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc., 512 U.S. at 642-43, 129 
L.Ed.2d at 518, 114 S.Ct. at 2459. See also Jones, 
188 I11.2d at 361-62. The fact that defendants' 
small-venue exemptions may have been intended to 
serve content-neutral goals is not dispositive. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that " '[ijllicit 
legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a 
violation of the First Amendment.' " Simon & 
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State 
Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105, 117, 116 
L.Ed.2d 476, 488, 112 S.Ct. 501, 509 (1991), 
quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. 
at 592, 75 L.Ed.2d at 309, 103 S.Ct. at 1376. We 
therefore reject defendants' contention that the 
existence of a content-neutral purpose renders the 
tax ordinances at issue here content-neutral. 
The language of the definitions from the City's 
adult use ordinance and the County's zoning 
ordinance, which were incorporated into the City's 
and County's respective small-venue exemptions, 
establishes that the adult entertainment cabaret 
exclusions, on their face, discriminate based on 
content. Specifically, the definitions in the 
amusement tax ordinances of live theatrical, live 
musical or other live cultural performance 
(Chicago Municipal Code § 4-156-010 (2006); 
Cook Count y Amusement Tax Ordinance, § 2 (eff. 
April 1,1999)) reference the definition of adult 
entertainment cabaret contained within the City's 
adult use ordinance or the County's zoning 
ordinance (Chicago Municipal Code § 16-16-030 
(2005); Cook County Zoning Ordinance of 2001, 
Art. 14.2.1 (2006)). Both the City's adult use 
ordinance and the County's zoning ordinance define 
an adult entertainment cabaret by the content of the 
expression featured at the establishment, e.g., 
topless dancing, stripping, entertainers who display 
specified anatomical areas (excessive breast or 
buttocks skin exposure), etc. Chicago Municipal 
Code § 16-16-030 (2005); Cook County Zoning 
Ordinance of 2001, art. 14.2.1 (2006). 
Consequently, read together, the operative language 
of those ordinances excludes from the amusement 
tax small-venue exemption those amusements that 
are defined, inso far as applied t o plaintiff, by 
semi-naked erotic performance art or expression. 
One cannot determine whether the operative criteria 
of the adult entertainment cabaret exclusions apply 
to a particular small venue without considering the 
content of the small venue's featured speech or 
expressive conduct. 
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Defendants are not aided by their citation 
to Leathers, where the Supreme Court found that an 
Arkansas statute extending the generally applicable 
sales tax to cable services (but not satellite 
services), while maintaining existing exemptions for 
magazines and newspapers, did not raise first 
amendment concerns. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 453, 
113 L.Ed.2d at 508, 111 S.Ct. at 1447. There, the 
Court determined that the Arkansas sales tax was 
not content-based because nothing in the statute 
referred to the content of mass media 
communications. Moreover, cable television offered 
subscribers a mixture of news, information, and 
entertainment and there was no record evidence that 
such material differed systematically in its message 
from that communicated by satellite broadcast 
programming, newspapers, or magazines. Leathers, 
499^U.S. at 449, 113 L.Ed.2d at 505, 111 S.Ct. at 
1445. Here, in contrast, defendants' adult 
entertainment cabaret exclusions are content-based 
and the content of the performances featured at such 
cabarets differs systematically in its erotic message 
from that communicated by the exempt fine arts 
venues. 
Compelling Interest 
*7 Accordingly, because the differential tax on 
erotic dance is a content-based regulation on 
protected expression, it is presumptively invalid and 
may be upheld only if it is necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end. Because defendants argued on 
appeal, unsuccessfully, that their tax schemes were 
content-neutral, they did not argue that their tax 
schemes served a compelling state interest in order 
to survive a first amendment strict scrutiny analysis. 
Alternatively, defendants argue that their adult 
entertainment cabaret exclusions do not prohibit or 
restrict exotic dancing but, rather, are governmental 
policy to encourage, through subsidization, the 
production of innovative fine arts performances at 
small venues in an effort to enhance the City's and 
County's reputations in the fine arts. Defendants 
contend that new and innovative shows have a 
greater chance of being chosen for production on 
Broadway or to tour nationally. Moreover, such 
shows may have the added effect of drawing new 
restaurants, shops and hotels to the surrounding 
community. Defendants argue that the most efficient 
way to subsidize small, fine arts venues is to give 
their patrons an exemption from the amusement tax, 
because it relieves small venues of the 
administrative and financial burdens that flow from 
having to collect the tax from patrons and remit it to 
the City and County at specified times. 
Defendants argue that state action that 
interferes is different from state action that 
encourages an alternative activity based on public 
policy. Citing Regan v. Taxation With 
Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 76 
L.Ed.2d 129, 103 S.Ct. 1997 (1983), Rust v. 
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 114 L.Ed.2d 233, 111 S.Ct. 
1759 (1991), and National Endowment for the Arts 
v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 141 L.Ed.2d 500, 118 S.Ct. 
2168 (1998), defendants argue that their tax 
schemes are consistent with Supreme Court rulings 
that allow the government to selectively fund a 
program to encourage certain activities it believes 
to be in the public interest without at the same time 
funding an alternative program. We disagree. 
Regan, Rust, and Finley do not establish that the 
government can encourage one private speaker over 
another based on content or message without 
implicating first amendment concerns. 
Regan held that an internal revenue statute that 
prohibited tax exempt charitable organizations from 
using tax-deductible contributions to support their 
lobbying efforts did not violate the first amendment, 
which did not require Congress to subsidize 
lobbying. Regan, 461 U.S. at 546, 76 L.Ed.2d at 
137, 103 S.Ct. at 2001. Furthermore, the statute did 
not violate the equal protection component of the 
fifth amendment, because it was rational for 
Congress to decide that, even though it would not 
subsidize substantial lobbying by charities 
generally, it would subsidize lobbying by veterans' 
organizations given our country's long-standing 
policy of compensating veterans for their past 
contributions by providing them with numerous 
advantages./tegtf/?, 461 U.S. at 550-51, 76 L.Ed.2d 
at 140, 103 S.Ct. at 2003-04. 
® 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
— N.E.2d — 
— N.E.2d —-, 2007 WL 4526527 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.) 
(Cite as: — N.E.2d — ) 
*8 Unlike the tax ordinances before us, 
Congress in Regan did not discriminate invidiously 
in granting its exemptions, which were not aimed at 
suppressing any ideas. Veterans' organizations were 
entitled to receive tax-deductible contributions 
regardless of the content of any speech they might 
use, including lobbying. Congress could exempt 
veterans' organizations from taxation differently 
than it did charitable organizations as long as the 
exemption was not content-based. Regan, 461 U.S. 
at 548, 76 L.Ed.2d at 138, 103 S.Ct. at 2002. Regan 
did not uphold, or even address, discrimination 
between speech or expressive activities based on 
content. 
In Rust, 500 U.S. at 178-80, 114 L.Ed.2d at 
246-47, 111 S.Ct. at 1764-66, regulations 
prohibited recipients of federal funds appropriated 
for family-planning services from engaging in 
counseling concerning, referrals for, and activities 
advocating abortion and required the recipients to 
maintain separate facilities, personnel and 
accounting records from any abortion activity. 
Those regulations did not violate first amendment 
free speech rights because the government did not 
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. The 
government merely chose to fund one activity to the 
exclusion of another, and the regulations simply 
ensured that federal funds were not used for 
activities, including speech, that were outside the 
scope of the federal program. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193, 
114 L.Ed.2d at 255, 111 S.Ct. at 1772. In contrast 
to our case, Rust concerned the dissemination to the 
public of a specific government message through a 
focused government subsidy program that paid 
organizations to distribute the government's 
message. Rust did not involve encouraging selected 
private speech by private citizens exercising their 
first amendment rights. Rust, 500 U.S. at 199, 114 
L.Ed.2d at 259, 111 S.Ct. at 1775. 
Defendants' reliance on Rust is misplaced 
because that case involved the government speech 
doctrine rather than government regulation of 
private speech. In accordance with the government 
speech doctrine, when the government itself is 
speaking or is paying a third party to speak to the 
public on the government's behalf, the government's 
message is not subject to first amendment 
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restrictions. This doctrine follows from the simple 
fact that the first amendment aims to protect 
citizens' free speech from government interference. 
Later, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the 
University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 132 L.Ed.2d 
700, 115 S.Ct. 2510 (1995), the Court reiterated the 
point that the constitutional regulation of speech 
discussed in Rust did not apply to a 
government-created program to encourage private 
speech, but was limited to situations where the 
government disbursed public finds to private 
speakers to transmit specific information pertaining 
to the government's own program. Rosenberger, 
515 U.S. at 833, 132 L.Ed.2d at 718, 115 S.Ct. at 
2519 (where student organizations were subsidized 
by a state university but were not agents of the 
university, the student organizations' subsidized 
speech was private speech rather than government 
speech and, thus, not exempt from first amendment 
protection). 
*9 In Finley, 524 U.S. at 581-83, 141 L.Ed.2d 
at 512-13, 118 S.Ct. at 2175-76, the Court upheld a 
grant program provision that implemented the 
consideration of decency and respect standards 
when determining which art projects would receive 
government subsidies. The provision was facially 
constitutional because it did not place conditions on 
grants or preclude awards to projects that might be 
deemed indecent or disrespectful. Finley, 524 U.S. 
at 581-83, 141 L.Ed.2d at 512-13, 118 S.Ct. at 
2175-77. Any content-based considerations taken 
into account in the grant-making process were a 
consequence of the nature of arts funding where the 
government agency's mandate was to make aesthetic 
judgments. Finley, 524 U.S. at 585-86, 141 L.Ed.2d 
at 514-15, 118 S.Ct. at 2177-78. The Court, 
however, reiterated that if the provision was applied 
so as to discriminate based on " 'certain ideas or 
viewpoints' " (i.e., in a content-based manner) or if 
the decency or respect standards were an enforced 
requirement, the provision would then be subject to 
strict scrutiny review. Finlev, 524 U.S. at 587, 141 
L.Ed.2d at 516, 118 S.Ct. at 2178-79, quoting 
Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 116, 116 
L.Ed.2d at 487, 112 S.Ct. at 508. As discussed 
above, defendants' adult entertainment cabaret 
exclusions discriminate against protected speech 
based on content. 
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Regan, Rust, and Finley do not support 
defendants' contention that affirmative government 
policies encouraging selective private speech do not 
implicate the first amendment and thereby escape 
strict scrutiny analysis. Moreover, we find no 
compelling state interest which necessitates the 
content-based adult entertainment cabaret 
exclusions contained in defendants' amusement tax 
schemes. Defendants argue that they have a 
legitimate interest in enhancing Chicago's and Cook 
County's reputations in the fine arts. We do not 
disagree wit h this proposition; however, their 
interests do no t rise to the level o f a compelling 
stat e inter est that will justify, under the first 
amendment, a content-based restriction on protected 
expression. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 
460 U.S. at 586, 75 L.Ed.2d at 305, 103 S.Ct. at 
1372 (raising revenue is not a compelling interest 
sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny). 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we hold that the City's and 
County's adult entertainment cabaret exclusions 
from the amusement tax small-venue exemptions 
are content-based regulations on speech that do not 
serve a compelling state interest and, therefore, 
violate the first amendment. Given this holding, we 
do not reach plaintiffs claims that the tax schemes 
are unconstitutionally overbroad or vague or violate 
the uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution. 
We reverse the orders of the trial court that granted 
defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim and remand this cause for further proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded. 
FITZGERALD SMITH, P.J., and TULLY, J., 
concur. 
Ill.App. 1 Dist.,2007. 
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